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Introduction 
 In late 2019, Han Seong-ok and her son, defectors from North Korea, died of starvation 
in their apartment in Seoul, South Korea. In the aftermath of this tragedy, the neighborhood 
vegetable stand owner said, “if only she had asked” noting that social safety nets would have 
helped them (Bicker 2019). Through this tragedy, many have asked who is to blame for this 
death. Rather than focus on blame, I suggest that it is worthwhile examining key differences 
between North Korea and South Korea that may have made it difficult for Han Sung-ok to voice 
her need and to adjust to life in South Korea. While not all stories of a lack of belonging for 
North Korean refugees are so severe, it raises questions about the depth of the divide between the 
North and the South and the extent to which it may be more than just a political divide. 
Unfortunately, the ever-looming threat of nuclear weapons often overshadows and colors 
the way that the international community characterizes the division between the people in the 
Republic of Korea (ROK; also known as South Korea) and the people in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK; also known as North Korea). Scholars see the division as a 
security issue and an economic issue, which is what influences the policy choices taken by the 
international community and the governments of the DPRK and the ROK. A large body of 
literature has amassed that has spoken to this issue through the Realist lens of international 
relations and the Institutionalist lens of international relations. This literature has framed the 
issue of division as either a problem of weapons, a problem of economics, or a problem of 
structural institutions. The scholars that focus on economics either point to the division between 
the two areas as a problem of communism versus capitalism or as a problem of a lack of ability 
to reunify due to the war stalemate the region is in. Others see it as a problem of institutions such 
as the way the government functions that differ between the two. While all these issues do 
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contribute to the divide of the peninsula, they fall short of explaining division in its whole which 
I will argue is a product of social constructions that differ between North and South. A social 
construct is an idea that has no meaning outside of what the community gives it and is generally 
built up and accepted over time. Ignoring the social differences has led to a lack of understanding 
of the difficulties of division at many levels. In other words, it is identity-based factors that can 
shed light on the historical and contemporary context of the Korean division. 
In this paper, I will focus on aspects of social identities that have been constructed over 
time in the different regions and their implications on the division. This extends to divisions that 
persist after individuals from the DPRK defect to the ROK, which I will refer to as micro-
reunification. Examining this will allow for a clearer understanding of the challenges that exist 
when individuals from each area are trying to communicate, when individuals defect into the 
ROK, and when considering macro-unification, which is the reunification of the entire peninsula. 
While it is not within the scope of this research to explore all social cleavages that affect 
division, it is a starting point, and it desires to highlight the importance of understanding the 
social constructions that divide Koreans. 
 The sustained division through the Korean Peninsula was an unexpected result of the rift 
caused by the Korean War as, historically, unified Korea was seen as unified both through 
nationalism and tradition which would seem to allow for an easy reunification (Barry 2012, 37-
38). Myoung-Kyu Park acknowledges the abnormality of this by stating "While the Soviet Union 
was dismantled and Eastern Europe transitioned into a reunified German regime, the structural 
division of the Korean peninsula has since remained unchanged" (2015, 28). Germany and many 
other countries that were torn apart by World War II and other conflicts were able to successfully 
reunify. However, this has not been the case on the Korean Peninsula, which should raise 
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questions of why we see lingering difficulties. This thesis suggests that there may be a division 
that pre-existed the war that sustained the rift. Some of the discourse within the two regions have 
been built of age-old ideas and principles which has allowed this to be sustained. Discourse as 
defined by Charlotte Epstein, international relations and political theory scholar, “is a cohesive 
ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations about a specific object that frame that object in 
a certain way and, therefore, delimit the possibilities for action in relation to it” (Epstein 2008, 
2).  
When researchers evaluate the division between the DPRK and the ROK, they mainly 
attribute the division to material factors, using Realist or Institutionalist theories of International 
Relations to offer explanations. Observing the division in this way leads to an incomplete 
understanding of the division because it ignores many of the social and cultural level divisions 
that persist between the DPRK and the ROK, which may be attributable to longstanding 
historical and linguistic divides. This project seeks to answer the question of how social groups 
and individual dynamics differ between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and 
the Republic of Korea (ROK) with special attention to the experience of division? And, how 
these differences structure the dynamics of formal division and the larger politics of 
reunification? 
I argue that Constructivist explanations can better explain the dynamics of division and 
the dynamics of reunification, both micro and macro, because they look at both the history and 
the social dynamics within states as the deciders of political outcomes. The oversimplified focus 
on material factors by Realists and Institutionalists will lead to a misunderstanding between the 
divided peninsula, by not considering the deeper roots of contemporary divisions. This extends 
to misunderstandings between defectors and natives, the governments of each state, and useful 
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policy for each state.  These divisions, as will be argued in this paper, are deeply embedded 
within the individuals of the DPRK and the ROK and can be traced back to the 19th century. 
These divisions must be considered when looking at the prospect of successful relations because, 
without a proper understanding of the social groups and dynamics embedded in individuals in 
both areas, any steps forward will fall short.  
This research seeks to explain the role of social, cultural, and identity factors by first 
giving a brief historical background. Then, it will analyze the current explanations of division, 
namely Institutionalism and Realism exploring how they look at nuclearization and economics as 
factors in the division. I then lay out my theoretical approach to the subject, drawing on 
Constructivist theory. Following this, I explore two examples to illustrate the insight that can be 
gained by a Constructivist approach: the ideology of Juche and the evolution of linguistic 
divisions. I will begin by explaining what Juche ideology is and its history in the DPRK. 
Through Juche, I will show how the ideas were constructed through history and discourse, and 
then how it is reinforced in the discourse of the DPRK. Then, I will explain the implications of 
the ideology and how it affects division between the DPRK and the ROK. While there are 
contrasting ideologies in the ROK to Juche, these are more difficult trace as there is more 
diversity of input both domestically and internationally so the primary focus will be on Juche. In 
the next section, I will explain the language differences between the DPRK and the ROK and 
how they came to exist. It is clear that the language differences are not simply a divergence of 
time but brought about through the conscious effort of the two societies. At the end of this 
section, I will offer some explanation on how this affects micro- and macro-reunification, to 
explore the larger policy implications. This will show not only that there is an identity-based 
division that must be considered to achieve viable options in addressing reunification or peaceful 
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coexistence but that these differences are deeply ingrained in social communities. I will conclude 
by wrapping up my findings, offer some insight into what this means for division and 
unification, and raising further questions that need to be answered. 
 Background: History of the Great Divide 
 The Korean peninsula has been divided into the DPRK and the ROK since 1945. For 
most people living in the two countries, they may not have known a time when the peninsula was 
not divided. Since the study of division is so deeply embedded in the war that occurred on the 
Korean peninsula, it is important to have a base knowledge of the events that brought this to be. 
This section will begin with a brief history of foreign influence in the Korean peninsula. The 
foreign influence is important for many future arguments of the paper. Then, given the historical 
nature of the project itself, it is important to also know which actors were involved in the 
political division and the Korean War as it will inform later discussions. While Korea has gone 
through many transformations over the past eight centuries, this history will be limited to the 
most important events that are pertinent to this paper. 
 Korea has experienced outside influence in its politics and culture that has affected the 
way that they have decided policy in the present from states near and far. In the time between 
1368 until 1566, Korea was a tributary state, which is a state that sends some form of 
compensation, in this case, traded goods, to a more powerful state, to the Ming dynasty in China 
(Nakajima 2018, 141). During this time, Neo-Confucianism became the most influential religion 
within Korea which was the predominant religion in the Ming dynasty and emphasized self-
cultivation (Lipman et al 2012, 30-31). After the fall of the Ming dynasty, it was replaced by the 
Qing dynasty and Korea still maintained tributary status to them until 1882 (Song 2019, 11).  
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In the late 1800s, Korea faced multiple struggles including low crop yield and conflict 
internal and external (Lipman et al 2012, 196). Between 1866 and 1871, Korea began to be 
pressured by the west to open its country to trade. France attempted to force entry in 1866 
followed by the United States attack on Korea with the General Sherman naval vessel. Both 
expeditions ultimately failed in their original mission (Lipman et al 2012, 197). Japan also began 
to increase pressure by sending its navy up in down Korea’s coastline without actively engaging. 
This culminated in them demanding their first unfair trade treaty in 1876 called the Kanghwa 
Treaty. After this treaty, Korea began to enter into many other unequal treaties with other Asian 
countries and many western countries as well such as the treaty with the US in 1882 (Lipman et 
al 2012, 198, 202). With many conflicting interests invested in Korea, Korea was caught in the 
middle of many quarrels between China and Japan (Lipman et al 2012, 201). This eventually led 
to the Sino-Japanese War from 1894 till 1895, in which Joseon, the dynasty in Korea that lasted 
from 1392 AD till 1910, and Japan were allies against the Qing culminating in conflict primarily 
between Japan and Qing (Lipman et al 2012, 203). This conflict concluded in a ceasefire signed 
in 1895. This allowed Japan to solidify its influence in Korea. 
From 1910-1945, Japan colonized Korea, but with the collapse of the Japanese empire 
after WWII, Korea was liberated by the Soviet and United States forces (Lipman et al 2012, 
304). The Soviets and the United States governments designated an arbitrary line referred to as 
the 38th parallel to establish a division of Korea. The US occupied the southern region of the 
peninsula and the Soviets occupied the north. While the two occupants tried to come to an 
agreement on the reunification of the peninsula, this failed in the end with neither side, including 
Koreans, being willing to compromise their political agenda (Herd 2015). In place of 
reunification, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) planned to 
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supervise national elections across the entire peninsula in 1948, but the Soviet Union blocked 
elections in the northern region and set up their own elections instead. By August of the same 
year, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established in the south with Syngman Rhee as the 
elected president followed by the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) with Kim Il Sung as the appointed leader in the north. Both leaders claimed sovereignty 
over the entirety of Korea (Edwards 2006, xx-xxi). Since both the north and the south had 
elected leaders in place, the United States and the Soviets withdrew most troops in their 
respective regions during this time; however, the United States left supporting forces to assist the 
new governments. The group of 500 men, called Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), was 
left to assist the newly found government in the south (Edwards 2006, 13).  
With the withdrawal of troops from the ROK, the United States’ attention shifted towards 
other political interests leaving a window of opportunity for the DPRK government in 1950 
(Edwards 2006, 13). Due to the United States supposed aversion to intervening in Korea and the 
factions of communists in the ROK, the DPRK troops, with loose support from China and the 
Soviet Union, moved south of the 38th parallel in June of 1950. A few days after the beginning of 
the invasion, the United States reaffirmed its support of the ROK, setting up a stronghold in 
Pusan called the Pusan Perimeter. The DPRK advanced deep into the ROK region. By 
September 10 of 1950, they had beaten the ROK back to the Pusan perimeter (Edwards 2006, 
14). On June 27th, 1950, the UN decided to send troops to aid in the efforts alongside the ROK 
and the US. The tide of the war shifted when the United Nations began its counterattack on 
September 15 of 1950. As the UN neared the border of China, the Chinese began their military 
progression to counter the threat on November 26 taking back Seoul. In January of 1951 with the 
addition of more troops, the UN made the push to the 38th parallel. Once reached, both groups 
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stayed put creating a stalemate, and then on July 27, 1953, both sides agreed to a cease-fire 
marked at the 38th parallel (Edwards 2006, xxiii). This armistice has been in place since this 
time. Since 1953, the two states have had little relationship with minimal interaction both 
economically and politically. Many families were separated into the North or the South with 
those in the DPRK unable to leave and those in the ROK having difficulty visiting. In the 1980s, 
the ROK transitioned to a democracy holding its first peaceful election and transition of power in 
1992 (USDOS 2018; Lee 1993, 41). In the 1990s, DPRK began to develop its nuclear weapons 
program; finally conducting its first nuclear weapons test in 2006. Since then, the DPRK 
continues to develop its nuclear program despite international pressure to denuclearize.  
Literature Review 
Division Through the Realist Perspective 
The realist theoretical framework argues that the Korean division can be explained by 
political and strategic factors and is due to factors such as the build-up of military and 
economics. The realist framework argues that states are inherently self-interested and motivated 
by the desire for survival and security (Slaughter 2011, 1-2). While some have drawn attention to 
the role of historical memory in modern Korean division, this realist narrative emphasizes the 
military history of the Korean war era in both ROK and DPRK populations. The literature deals 
with the division within the different populations, focusing on the differences between the state 
powers that intervened in the Korean War and how these differences dictated their trajectory 
thereafter. Many scholars who adopt this line of thinking maintain that the division through the 
peninsula is largely based on the strategic decision-making surrounding outside intervention, or 
the larger geopolitical considerations. The DPRK characterizes the ROK as under the power and 
control of the US who made them do its bidding as a type of colonial power (Lee 2013, 102). 
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Lee, a scholar of government and law, maintains that they also believe that the continued 
influence of the United States means that the ROK is under its control. The DPRK sees this 
relationship as a threat as they view the US as attempting to gain control also of the DPRK. 
According to realist scholars, this US influence is why the DPRK continues to remain separate 
from the ROK, stockpile weapons, and build up a nuclear arsenal. According to these theorists, 
the DPRK wants to remain sovereign and militarily strong, emphasizing the significance of state 
power in this theoretical approach. In contrast, the ROK characterizes the war as a civil war that 
was throttled into action by the communist invasion in the north and mainly focuses on the 
interference of both the Russians and the Chinese (Lee 2013, 102). From this perspective, the 
ROK wants to remain sovereign and remain in power as they believe that their form of 
government is the right form. Some researchers in this framework claim that the remembering of 
the war has extended the division between the two states (Lee 2013, 102).  
Realists have done much research on the prolonged division and how it was facilitated by 
the DPRK and the ROK. A dominant argument within this analysis is that the nuclearization of 
the DPRK is one of the reasons that the peninsula stays divided. Eunice Lee, an international law 
scholar, represents this claim but also claims that this is one of the main factors in driving the 
reunification talks forward due to the threat that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) poses to the Republic of Korea (ROK) (2010, 261-262). He argues that it both facilitates 
reunification talks and debilitates the reunification of ROK and DPRK. This argument is not 
unique and is held by many. In the current policy on the Korean Peninsula set by Moon Jae-In, 
peaceful resolution hinges on denuclearization (Ministry of Reunification 2017). Two of the four 
strategies to meet the goals for the Korean Peninsula, which are “resolution of the North Korean 
nuclear issue and establishment of permanent peace”, “development of sustainable inter-Korean 
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relations”, and “realization of a new economic community on the Korean peninsula”, have to do 
with denuclearization of the DPRK (Ministry of Unification 2017). While President Moon does 
not deny that there are other factors to consider, this does highlight the overemphasis of nuclear 
weapons in the Korean Peninsula policy coming from the ROK. The focus on denuclearization 
asserts that if the DPRK denuclearized the peninsula would reunify with little hindrance. While 
this may seem like a clear answer to why Korea remains divided upon further examination it 
misses out on many factors that perpetuate division. Those who view nuclearization as the main 
cause of division between the DPRK and the ROK seek to solve the problem of division by 
removing nuclear weapons. This view assumes that denuclearization would allow the peninsula 
to reunify.  
Another threat that Myoung-Kyu Park, director of the Institute for Peace and Unification 
Studies at Seoul National University, sees as a dividing factor is the cybersecurity threat that the 
DPRK poses to the ROK (2015, 27-28). This is a relatively new threat under the realist theory as 
it only really developed in the 21st century. This is the idea that the threat of warfare using cyber 
networks, warfare includes hacking into energy sources and cutting off power, is a contributing 
factor to the division between the ROK and the DPRK. This puts the two countries at odds with 
one another because they both perceive threat from the other in this area, which keeps them 
divided because they exist in a state of defense.  
There is another realist view that claims that the division can be traced to diplomatic 
neglect by the United States and the global community (Miller 2003, 20). This is a view of 
realism which believes that the state of the US is what determined the trajectory of the DPRK 
and the ROK. In this application of realism, the groups within Korea never had a legitimate 
divisionary impact in the war; it came into being because of the war between the US and the 
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Soviets. This view states that if the US set up a policy or withdraws from the region then peace 
would ensue. This view assumes that there would have been no division across the 38th parallel 
if the US and the Soviet Union had not intervened. While the US certainly served as a catalyst to 
the divide, this perspective ignores the possibility that division already existed that allows the 
division to persist.  
In the realist framework, scholars assume that the intervention of superpowers, such as 
the Soviet Union and the US, can best explain the division of the peninsula. For them, the 
division is solely political, stemming from the strategic goals of countries such as the US. For 
these scholars, they believe that the solution to division is solved by a shift in policies such as the 
removal of nuclear weapons, the removal of other threats, and a change of government policies. 
This falls short in explaining the reasons that North Korean defectors struggle with their 
miniature reunifications with the ROK, does not explain many of the cultural divisions, and 
assumes these cultural factors are not essential to reunification. Realism ignores that the division 
has been entrenched by the social constructions that differ between the ROK and the DPRK.  
Division Through the Institutionalist Perspective 
The institutionalist theoretical framework focuses on the regime type, economic type, and 
outside relationships of the states with global institutions (Jonson & Tallberg 2009, 6).  
Institutionalists believe that the division between the peninsula can be explained by the 
institutions which are in place economic and political structure and how the international 
community interacted with these states. This is a perspective held by South Korea’s Former 
Minister of Unification Hyun In-taek who said in his 2010 speech that "The Government hopes 
to build a process that draws upon the participation of the public so that we can discuss and 
consider a broad set of unification issues, not only those related to the financial costs of 
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unification” (Ministry of Unification 2010). This speech shows that he believes that unification 
can only exist through government policies and the changing of how they operate. This is a 
major defining feature of the institutionalist frame of thought. 
Political science scholar Uk Heo and national security scholar Terence Roehrig argue that 
the regime and economy of the ROK have influenced the division between the ROK and the 
DPRK. They argue that since the ROK has been able to change to a democratic regime and grow 
economically that the aid policies that they have made with the DPRK have softened animosity 
between the two states (Heo & Roehrig 2018, 125). They argue that economic growth has led to 
reformed foreign and international policy including their policy with the DPRK which have 
softened the regimes towards each other (Heo & Roehing 2018, 137). While this does not 
explain the division explicitly, it does imply that the division can be fixed by economic policies.  
While institutions explain some elements of the divisions such as the lack of 
implementation of better economic policies or differences in regime type, they do not offer 
information on how the differences in discourse and social constructs contribute to the division. 
This is important to discuss as it would increase the understanding of the division between the 
peninsula by tracing how these accepted ideologies came to be. The social dynamics, ideas, and 
identities that are found amongst individuals and affect their behavior are ignored by the 
institutionalist framework. Institutionalism fails to explain the experience of division. 
Theoretical Framework 
 Previously, this thesis discussed how the theories of realism and institutionalism fall short 
in explaining the division between the DPRK and the ROK. I will focus on analyzing the 
division through the constructivist lens of international relations. Constructivism argues that 
socially constructed verbal or substantive narratives and identities influence policy outcomes, not 
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just institutions and state interests (Nau 2007, 31). Social construction is an idea or object that 
does not have meaning outside of the collective meaning that has been decided about that idea or 
object. An example of this is legal tender such as the US dollar which has no value outside the 
value that has been accepted over time through government policies and collective decision 
making. In other words, we all agree that money has value, but this value only exists because of 
shared meanings and understandings. Social constructs are important because they show 
researchers how most people think and make decisions and what weight elements of life carry in 
the mind of individuals. In this view, material realities are a physical outcropping of the ideas 
which have been constructed over time. The construction is accomplished by concepts that have 
been accepted by a vast majority of society: an example of this construction is social classes 
which has no meaning outside of the meaning given to it by society. The point of constructivism 
is to illuminate the social constructions that influence a certain issue.  
 Throughout this paper, idea is defined as a concept that is developed over time through an 
intersection of material, historical, and institutional factors. Ideas differ between societies. This 
means that an idea is itself a social construction. Ideas that have been constructed may contribute 
to new social constructions. Ideology is also an important term within this paper. Ideology is 
defined in this research as the drawing together of ideas into a map for how a person or group of 
people functions and makes decisions (Freeden 2006, 20). The map is manufactured by a group 
individuals and consumed by a group of individuals. While ideologies are designed by a group, 
they are fundamentally social constructions as they are derived from ideas.  
This research will identify a couple of social constructions that contribute to the division 
between the DPRK and the ROK and cause challenges for reunification at both the micro and the 
macro levels. I use micro-reunification as the lower level unifications of individuals to the 
 14 
  
 
country they did not originate from. I use macro-reunification as the higher-level unification 
between the states of the DPRK and the ROK. This is mainly seen in North Koreans defecting to 
South Korea which has maintained a rate of more than a thousand individuals per year since 
2001 (Ministry of Unification 2019). Ideological discourse has developed the idea of the “other”, 
the person or group of people another individual or group of people think of as outside of 
themselves, which is essential for the division imaginary between the DPRK and the ROK (Son 
2015, 47-49). This research specifically looks at the Juche ideology constructed through history, 
discourse, and policy that differentiates the “us” from the “them” necessary for division in the 
DPRK (Nau 2007, 32). This study then analyzes the difference in language and how that 
constructs the division through distinct markers of dialects, lack of common words, and the 
ideation of uneducated dialect.  
 This research is not claiming that constructivism explains every aspect of division 
because there are components of states and institutions that contribute to the division. They do 
not explain the whole discourse of division which was catalyzed by social constructions. My 
perspective shows the challenges that will potentially lie ahead that have not yet been considered 
fully in research. Social constructs that will continue to reinforce divisions between the 
individuals from the two societies even if weapons are removed, state structures are changed, and 
institutions are developed and reformed. The discourse around these constructs represent 
challenges that must be considered. This research argues that a consideration of these constructs 
along with the perspectives on reunification analyzed before gives a clearer picture of the issue 
of division between the ROK and the DPRK. This constructivist analysis also reveals why the 
institutions and state issues divide the nations. Much like in Jutta Weldes’ discussion of national 
interests in The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis, this study asserts that the division 
 15 
  
 
between the DPRK and the ROK is socially constructed through cultural and intersubjectively 
established meanings that are different within the two countries (1999, 10). Intersubjectivity is 
the sharing of an idea by multiple individuals. It is, in short, a collective way of thinking that 
imbues something with meaning. Weldes looks at how the idea of a country being a nuclear 
threat is constructed through the discourse within the society. She examines the Cuban Missile 
Crisis and how the United States responded to this crisis. She talks about how the discourse 
within the society led to intersubjective understanding within the United States to see Cuba as a 
threat whereas they did not see places like the United Kingdom as a threat. She argues that 
discourse and social construction leads to this intersubjectivity within the United States.  
 In the following pages, this study will argue that there are social constructs in both the 
DPRK and the ROK that contribute to the division between the two countries. This will be done 
by looking at how Juche permeates the DPRK society, how Juche was derived from history, how 
Juche is in the discourse of the DRPK citizens, and how Juche presents challenges when 
considering unification. This will show that the Juche concept has been constructed over time 
and through society and culture. I chose Juche as it is a predominant ideology in the DPRK and 
the way it has been accepted there. This study will show that Juche is an essential explanation of 
the division of the peninsula.  In the following section, I will explore the development and 
divergence of language in the DPRK and the ROK. Since discourse drives construction and 
language is one primary way in which groups of people differentiate each other, this section will 
focus on these divergences to show how this contributes to the division between the two Koreas. 
This study chose language because of the long history of languages being used as markers to 
identify different peoples. This analysis is essential to the divisionary discussion as language has 
been used for centuries to divide people. This is not different on the Korean peninsula. Another 
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reason for focusing on linguistic analysis is because of the way linguistic divergences have 
developed which has not been just a process of time but of many other social and ideational 
factors, a key argument made by constructivists, who focus on the role of language and 
discourse. These sections will bring light to the fact that there are many social constructs within 
the discourse and collective practice within the DPRK and the ROK that further deepen division. 
Juche and the Division 
Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to show why ideas matter by using the concept of Juche as 
a case study and by observing how Juche has contributed to the division between the DPRK and 
the ROK. Juche is one of the primary differences between the DPRK and the ROK and therefore 
is important to the study of how division has developed. This section will show how Juche has 
become an ideology that has been integrated into the discourse of the DPRK’s society. It will 
also show how the Juche ideology was constructed through history and shows how the Korean 
peninsula has diverged over time. It will begin by explaining the history of how it evolved into 
its current form. Then, it will explain the features of Juche and how it corresponds to those tenets 
of eastern thought. Finally, it will analyze how this ideology became deeply engrained in the 
discourse of DPRK society. Juche is a form of nationalism that has been developed through 
social construction and is a source of identity for the people. While I am not interested in the 
state itself, this research is more interested in the kind of ideas and nationalism within the 
population that are reinforced through everyday social constructions. This is exactly what Juche 
shows in the DPRK.  
While there are contrasting concepts and ideologies in the ROK, Juche will be explored 
in this section with only brief references to the contrast in the ROK. This is because there are 
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multiple levels of influence both coming from within the ROK and outside the ROK by the 
global community. The ROK due to the free flow of ideas in and out of the country creates some 
difficulty in tracing how concepts were constructed. While it can be done, that is outside of the 
scope of this project and will be examined in a future project.  
Juche Genealogy 
Many scholars have debated the exact origins of Juche ideology; however, the leadership 
of the DPRK touts it as the original thought of Kim Il Sung (Lee 2003, 107). Contrary to the 
claims of leadership, this study and a few other scholars find the most supporting evidence in the 
claim that Juche was derived from history, including outside intervention by many surrounding 
territories, and ideas such as Confucianism and Marxist-Leninism. The word Juche, while 
constructed from age-old principles, was first used in 1955 in a speech by Kim Il Sung 
(Kurbanov 2005, 298). The consensus around the claim that Juche was constructed over time is 
based on the information that Juche ideology pulls from each of these historical events and 
ideologies that have developed it.  
While the Juche ideology began as an adaptation of Leninism that would be suitable for 
the special case of the DPRK, it has evolved and often serves to disavow the linkage to the 
former Soviet Union (Park 2014, 6). Juche is the ideology that emphasizes self-reliance. 
However, this concept is difficult to define as it has several ramifications and some 
inconsistencies. The self-reliance aspect of Juche means that they should be able to provide for 
themselves from their own resources without the need for outside assistance (Alpay 2012, 34). 
This aspect of Juche was used to lessen influence from the Soviet Union and China in the DPRK 
(Lee 2003, 108). As time went on Juche ideology developed. It put man as the center of the 
universe thus showing the emphasis in man as the primary master within Juche (Kurbanov 2005, 
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297). Juche emphasized filial piety placing the mother as the state itself and the father as the 
leader of the DPRK (Armstrong 2005, 389). This claim backs up the idea that it is necessary for 
leaders to come from the same lineage. The leader is also perceived to be benevolent, fighting for 
the people and for revolution, which means reunification instead of equality in the case of the 
DPRK (Alpay 2012, 35). The leader and the people are one. In other words, the leader being the 
head and the people being the other functional parts of the body thus emphasize how they must 
function together (Alpay 2012, 35). While the material self will die, Juche emphasizes that the 
political self is immortal (Alpay 2012, 35). 
 The history of Korea has been extremely tumultuous. The peninsula has been invaded, 
occupied, and leached of resources primarily by Japan and China. From 1368 until 1882, Korea 
was a tributary state to China. In this type of relationship, the weaker state is to pay the stronger 
state with gifts of trade. This allows the weaker state to minimize the risk of invasion of the 
stronger country, but it does come with a price (Swope 2002, 780-781). Between 1910 and 1945, 
Japan occupied Korea and drained many of its resources, including humans. Koreans were 
forced to grow food for the Japanese military and complete other hard-labor tasks, in which 
many did not survive, under Japanese occupation (Min 2003, 943). During the wartime period 
(1937-1945), the Japanese subjected the people of Korea to slave-like conditions, including 
forcing girls and young women to become “comfort women”, women who were forced into 
military sexual slavery to mainly military officials of the Japanese imperial army (Min 2003, 
938). Some comfort women never found their way back to the motherland as they were 
“stationed” at many different areas in the Asia and Pacific region (Soh 2000, 64). The history of 
colonization is one reason that the leaders of the DPRK chose to develop the ideology of Juche. 
In Juche, one of the primary desires is to maintain independence from foreign powers. This is 
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largely based on history with their neighbors and the intervention from both China and Japan in 
their history.  
 The history of Korea also contributed to the construction of the ideas of independence 
and protection from outside powers’ influence in the Juche ideology. From 1392 to 1910, Korea 
took on extreme isolationist policies, except to trade with China and limited trade with Japan, 
earning it the name the “hermit kingdom” (Lee 2003, 108). After several Western incursions and 
much debate on whether to open ports to the outside world in the mid-nineteenth century, the 
peninsula began to open ports to the outside world after signing unequal treaties with major 
regional and Western powers (Lipman et al 2012, 198). Up until the division between the DPRK 
and the ROK, there was continued disagreement on whether opening to trade was beneficial for 
the Korean state. After the Korean War, this debate was settled for the DPRK with the institution 
of Juche, which asserts that independence from outside actors is of utmost importance. While 
this ideology is not consistently applied in aid reception, it remained as an ideology that the 
leaders reinforce within the populace using isolationist rhetoric and in their international policy.  
 Confucianism is arguably the ideology in Korean history and society that contributes the 
most to the overall idea of Juche. Confucianism is a well-known and well-practice worldview in 
Eastern Asia. Credited to Confucius (551-479 BCE) in China, Confucianism was transmitted to 
Korea from China, but it was a specific interpretation developed by Zhu Xi (1130-2000), which 
combined Confucianism with Taoism and Buddhism, that was brought to Korea from Yuan 
China (1279–1368) (Koh 2003, 62-63). Referred to as Neo-Confucianism, this worldview began 
its rise in Korea in the late 1300s and evolved during the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910). During 
different periods within this dynasty, various elements of Neo-Confucianism were emphasized 
by the different rulers. Filial piety is to pay high respect for one’s elders and ancestors, especially 
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parents, in the home and outside of the home by serving them obediently (Lipman et al. 2012, 
32). Filial piety led to people making decisions and performing tasks to bring pride and honor to 
their families. Filial piety maintains social order as it ensures that respect and obedience are 
shown to elders. Filial piety is one of the elements of Confucianism that helped in the social 
construction of the Juche ideology. Similar in its use in history, filial piety is important in Juche, 
allowing leaders to mobilize the masses during times when duty to each other and to the leader 
needed to be reinforced (Armstrong 2005, 389). The benevolent government, or “kingly way”, 
which emphasized people-based politics and benevolent leadership is another element of both 
Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism that was implemented during the Joseon time period. The 
“kingly way” maintained that the ruling class was the moral model for the society underneath 
them (Lipman et al 2012, 51). The main goal and use of this ideal ensured political loyalty and 
respect. This is a major constructive feature of Juche. Neo-Confucianism during the Joseon time 
period also emphasized self-reliance, humans as the center of the universe and highest being 
derived from “wise governing” tenant, and social classism (Kurbanov 2019, 298 & 302). 
Social Construction of Juche 
There are many features of Juche that make it so ingrained in the society of the DPRK 
that was constructed and can be traced through the history of Korea and discourse. This 
discussion will begin by explaining the importance of the historical element of Juche. Next, it 
will explain the daily reinforcement tools used by the people that help reinforce the ideology. 
Finally, this section will explain the discourse within the society that reinforce Juche ideology. 
This discussion will show how the ideology of Juche has served as a major factor in the division 
paradigm and show the process of how an idea becomes intersubjective and influential in the 
discourse within society.  
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 As is seen throughout the previous analysis of historical ideas that shaped Juche, it is 
easily recognizable that the ideology was constructed from previously established concepts. The 
example of filial piety is one that is dominant within Juche and within the history of Korea, 
although more significant in the DPRK than in the ROK. In the DPRK, the concept of filial piety 
made it easier for the leaders to construct the Juche idea of having the state as the mother and the 
leader as the father. This allowed the leadership to justify why the subjects must respect and 
support the leader in a more familial style than in an oppressive nature. Faithfulness to the leader 
was also not a new concept as this was an expectation toward previous rulers. The isolationist 
tendencies of the past and the rhetoric of outside countries being a threat to the DPRK also made 
the self-sufficiency policy easy for the populace to accept. The threat of other states came from 
when Korea was a tributary state of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) and then the Qing dynasty 
(1644-1881) of China. A tributary system allows for the stronger state to impose trade, policy, 
and specific leadership on the weaker state with the promise that the stronger state will not attack 
the weaker (Swope 2002, 780-781). Then, Japan warred with China and gained control of Korea 
from 1910 till 1945 (Lipman et al 2012, 53-54). Isolationism, as previously stated, was a highly 
debated topic leading up to the Korean War and became solidified by the idea of self-sufficiency 
in Juche. In other words, the discourse of Juche generated a common understanding of the 
national interest surrounding these facets of Korean identity, something which came even more 
to the fore after partition in 1945. 
With a long history of the ancestral spiritualism that still dominates Korean culture in 
both the DPRK and the ROK, the idea that the political self exists forever was not a difficult 
transition in the minds of the people in the DPRK. The area in which the DPRK diverges from 
traditional ancestralism is where they believe in political eternalism. The political eternal spirit 
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implies the ancestor’s political commitment can follow the family so the individual must perform 
well because it not only affects their status but the status of their descendants within the DPRK. 
Due to this, Songbun, the political caste system within the DPRK related to Juche which will be 
discussed further in the next section, is salient in the culture and an institutional outcropping of 
Juche. Political eternalism also legitimized the idea that Kim Il Sung lives forever through his 
descendants and his political legacy which is why leaders of the DPRK all come from the Kim 
family.  
 In the DPRK, Juche permeates social discourse. Many of the daily tasks that people 
perform and recite throughout their lives reinforce Juche. These tendencies are not considered 
strange to those who live in the DPRK as they have been engaged in them since a young age and 
serve to remind them of who they are and where they are from. It is easy for people from 
different cultures to think that these elements of society are overtly oppressive; however, people 
who live within the context rarely recognize that the activities they engage in are any different 
from anywhere else. For many in the DPRK, the aspects of daily life that will be discussed may 
not even receive a second thought despite it being mandated that they behave in such a way. 
These practices contribute to the nationalist identity of the people in the DPRK. To begin the 
most obvious reinforcement of Juche are the many celebrations that they have in reverence of the 
leader and their success as a society. The most glamorous and lengthy are those celebrating Kim 
Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un’s birthdays. These events are used to celebrate, reinforce 
the supremacy of the leader, and to show the extravagance of the leaders and the country to the 
people so that they may see how far they have come. This discourse reinforces the idea of the 
paternalism of the leader who throws a celebration for them to attend, helps reinforce the idea of 
unity within the community, reinforces nationalism among the populace, and reinforce the 
 23 
  
 
strength and independence within the country. The debate of whether these celebrations are 
misrepresenting the country’s wealth and power is a discussion for another paper, but this is how 
they serve to construct Juche and establish the ideology within the discourse of the people in the 
DPRK (Choi 2018).  
 
Image 1: Day of the Sun celebration in Pyong’yang in 2017 to celebrate the birth of Kim Il-
sung. “North Korea marks late leader’s 105th birthday” Aljazeera, Accessed March 24, 2020,  
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2017/04/north-korea-marks-late-leader-105th-
birthday-170415141923126.html. 
 
 Respect for all things bearing the image or rendering of the country’s leaders is 
mandatory for all citizens (U.S. Department of State 2019). This means that in many hallowed 
places of the leader, people are required to bow to leaders’ images and to keep a neat appearance 
around these images. This act reinforces the supremacy of the Kims and is a regular event in 
their daily lives to participate in. However, this is not necessarily an odd thing for the people of 
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the DPRK to participate in becoming an almost automatic activity since this respect for the 
leader was required since infancy. Bowing, which shows respect especially to elders and leaders, 
and respect is prolific in Korean history and still exists in the ROK as well; however, it is not 
mandated that people bow, while it is considered rude to not greet someone, especially an elder, 
with a bow. In ROK, people engage in bowing to ancestors or others of their own free will as a 
sign of respect, which has been constructed from a long history of practicing the Confucian 
tradition. After the deaths of their leaders, the leadership attributes it to the leader’s deep concern 
for the people who suffer within the DPRK. This explanation is successful in influencing the way 
that the individuals within the DPRK view the leadership as exemplified in this statement, 
“North Hamgyong suffered most severely. As you know, the Dear Leader Kim Il Sung worried 
so much about the people’s livelihoods in North Hamgyong and passed away due to a heart 
attack… People think that everything’s the fault of mid-level bureaucrats” (Choi 2013, 668). 
This leads to the populace believing that those who are corrupt are those who are in lower levels 
of power and not the supreme leader of the country. This allows for whatever hardship that is 
experienced by the people to be blamed on the mismanagement of the bureaucrats thus 
reinforcing Juche as they believe the supreme leader always has the interests of the people at 
heart and is a benevolent leader.  
The Juche calendar, which begins on Kim Il Sung’s day of birth, is the calendar that 
people in the DPRK follow. It reinforces the discourse on both the prominence of the leader and 
the individualism and self-sufficiency to the extent that the calendar has been changed (Wood & 
Terry 2016, 507). One of the more important products of Juche is the use of Songbun. Songbun 
is the system by which citizens of the DPRK are ranked according to their families and their 
record of perceived loyalty and fulfilled duty to the government. It affects what jobs an 
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individual can have, what school kids can go to, and social mobility (Robertson 2016). This 
record can go back as far as World War II which has been a problem for some individuals whose 
grandparents may have been a supporter of Japan during that time (Robertson 2016). This 
reinforces the Juche idea of the political self being eternal and the importance of state and leader 
loyalty as the ultimate morality.  
 Juche is also reinforced by monuments within the DPRK. Many monuments are 
dedicated just to the idea of Juche and ones that are related to elements of Juche. The first is the 
Kumsusan Palace of the Sun. This is the former palace of Kim Il Sung and now serves as the 
resting place for both him and Kim Jong Il. They are both embalmed and on display for 
mourners and tourists. It is required that visitors dress nicely and show proper respect (Tongil 
Tours 2019). Throughout the mausoleum are pictures of the leaders and signs of grandeur such 
as marble pillars and floors. In the rooms of the leaders, there are rows of live military officials 
showing their dedication. Many Koreans come to grieve the great leaders or show remembrance. 
This reflects the idea of Juche as it encourages the reverence that citizens have for their deceased 
leaders and reminds them of how well these leaders have led them through the pictures, statues, 
and the preserved bodies of their leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Another monument that 
serves a similar purpose in reminding the people of their great leaders’ guidance is Kim Il Sung 
Square. This is where mass holiday celebrations and military parades take place. This is an 
important ode to Juche as it holds many military parades, which through the strength allows the 
country to remain sovereign and independent of outside forces, and the celebrations of holidays 
such as their leaders’ birthdays, independence days, and other such holidays.  
Another monument that reinforces Juche’s ideas and practice is the Mansudae Grand 
Monument. It is a set of two statues: one is of Kim Il Sung and the other is of Kim Jong Il. This 
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area also requires much respect and it is important for observes to dress appropriately and to bow 
to the two leaders. This again reminds the people of the leaders’ importance. When tourists come 
to observe the spot, they are told that the two leaders would have never desired that these 
monuments made because they were humble, but the people insisted that they are made (Wood 
& Terry 2016, 509). This discourse reinforces the idea that the Kims are benevolent and selfless 
leaders of their people which coincides with Juche. Below the statues there are also small 
pictures of people contributing to the development of Korea are present showing how important 
the people are to the success of the leader and vice versa. Many Pyong’yang residents are 
encouraged to mark special events at this monument, such as weddings (Wood & Terry 2016, 
510). 
 Outside of leader appreciation, there is the Tower of the Juche Idea, pictured below. This 
is a highly symbolic structure that is the tallest granite tower in the world. It has a torch that is lit 
within it and does not go out. It also has several figures around it to reinforce the ideas of Juche. 
As the highest granite tower in the world, this statue symbolizes their self-sufficiency. It also 
symbolizes the centrality of Juche ideology within the DPRK because of the prominence of the 
tower. A final display to reinforce the social construction that is Juche is the display of the USS 
Pueblo. It was a United States vessel which the DPRK captured that the government accused the 
crew of spying in domestic waters in 1968. After the capture of all but one of the crew members, 
the government tortured and threatened death in order to get a confession (Wood & Terry 2016, 
513). This navy ship has been used to show the great power that the DPRK has in overcoming, as 
they would call them, infiltration by imperialists like the United States. They also connect this 
incident back to their long history of invasion by outside countries including going so far back as 
the USS General Sherman which was sent to Korea in 1886 to force open the ports of Korea. The 
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DPRK claims that the Pyong’yang villagers attacked the ship and killed the crew (Wood & Terry 
2016, 514). This narrative again reinforces the long history of Korea having to resist outside 
powers which is an important part of Juche.  
 
Image 2: Tower of the Juche Idea. “Tower of the Juche Idea” Lonely Planet, Accessed March 
24, 2020, https://www.lonelyplanet.com/north-korea/pyongyang/attractions/tower-of-the-juche-
idea/a/poi-sig/435034/357182. 
Conclusion 
 Juche is a clear example of a constructed ideology that has contributed to the division 
between the DPRK and the ROK. Through time, it is seen that the Juche concept was developed 
by Confucianism, foreign intervention, tradition, and old domestic and foreign policy. The 
longstanding social constructions have allowed the DPRK to easily establish and transition into 
Juche. Along with the historical construction of Juche, there has also been the ever-present 
discourse of Juche in the daily lives of the people of the DPRK. The use of parades, the 
monuments and decorum around them, and the discourse of the government all reinforce public 
discourse to establish Juche. 
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The tenets of Juche pose significant reinforcement of division. The most obvious is the 
self-sufficiency and isolationist policies and the discourse in the populace of the DPRK. This 
divides them from the ROK as the two countries are not seen as one currently, and therefore the 
DPRK sees ROK as an outside, hostile power. The individuals and the state have great aversion 
to outside interference, which is an idea embedded in Juche. This perspective stands in stark 
contrast to the government and people in the ROK who are extremely open to globalization and 
have a high level of US military presence within their borders. What deepens the division is that 
the ROK does not mandate any type of respect or loyalty around leaders and also holds free and 
fair elections for the people to be in power. This system is very different from the Juche ideology 
in which lineage is considered the reason why the Kims remain in power and why they are 
revered even after death. All of these factors contribute to the division between the DPRK and 
the ROK.   
Language and the Division 
Introduction 
 While natural divergence in a language is expected to an extent between a divided area, 
what is seen on the Korean peninsula is an interesting case. In this case, the language difference 
has been exacerbated given the policy, economic, and ideological differences between the DPRK 
and the ROK. The divergence of language has been discussed since the 1970s, approximately 
twenty years since the geographic and political division between the DPRK and the ROK. Chin-
Wu Kim noted in the 70s that there would be greater language divergence due to social 
progressions and policies already being implemented (Kim 1978, 169). Kim’s argument suggests 
that this has not only been a natural progression but also a divergence that has been accelerated 
by multiple factors. The divergence was visible to the public in the joint 2018 Olympic Hockey 
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team of Korea who had difficulty communicating with one another (Hamad 2018, 23). While the 
divergence may seem insignificant, it carries much weight as it affects how the individuals of 
both countries relate to one another, including how they identify themselves, how they 
communicate, and how they are socially classified. This section will examine language as one 
social construction of identity differences on the Korean Peninsula. It will begin by tracing the 
historical evolution of language on the peninsula in general and then look at the DPRK and the 
ROK individually. This discussion will offer evidence on the significance of linguistics and 
ideational divisions in order to properly understand the division of the two Koreas. 
History of Language in Korea 
 Due to the vast overlap between several languages in the region, the Korean language has 
close relationships with other languages such as Japanese and Chinese (Song, 2012, 9). Korean’s 
origins are highly debated with many maintaining it is from the Altaic family of languages. 
While Chinese is often used in the form of loanwords and words built on Chinese roots, some 
linguists have surmised that Korean is more evolutionarily related to Japanese. Over the years of 
the existence of two Koreas, the Korean language has seen several changes to language policy 
and the imposition of other languages as national languages on the Korean peninsula. Before 
1443, Korean was written in Chinese characters. However, due to illiteracy rates and the 
difficulty of learning the Chinese characters, King Sejong developed the writing system that is 
now used throughout most of Korean text called Han-geul (Song 2005, 164; Asia Society, n.d.). 
However, after its inception, Han-geul was generally only used by the lower class and women 
while Chinese writing began to only be used by elites (Park 1989, 565). Most history in this 
period was recorded in classical Chinese (Park 1989, 564). It was not until the 19th century that 
Han-geul became the predominant mode of written communication due to nationalism prompted 
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by Russian and Japanese occupation (Song, 2005, 164). Han-geul continues to live by that name 
in South Korea; however, in North Korea, it is called Joseon-geul. Korea had its first encounter 
with English in 1797, and, in 1894, many students began to learn English in order to raise job 
prospects and raise status (Paik 2018, 124).  
 As mentioned previously, Korea experienced several colonization incidents. The most 
brutal of which was the Japanese colonization from 1910-1945. In 1935, Japan instated that only 
Japanese be used within Korea, both in school teaching and in daily communications (Lipman 
2012, 312-313; Park 1989, 565). The Japanese colonial rulers even mandated that people begin 
to change their names to Japanese-based names during the wartime period (Lee 2018, 27). 
Korean usage was also used to mark who was Korean and who was not Korean during this time, 
which allowed Koreans to be identified and targeted for violence carried out by Japanese leaders 
(Song 2005, 165; Lee 2018, 27). Japanese language policy completely backfired and contributed 
to an overall feeling that the Korean language has been under attack in both the DPRK and the 
ROK following the colonization and the sense that nationalism is tightly connected to the Korean 
language (Park 1989, 566). As will be seen in later discussion, the two countries dealt with this 
fear in different ways.  
 Before 1945, Korea had many dialects with the primary dialect being the Seoul or 
Gyeonggi dialect. The Seoul dialect became the official dialect of Korea in 1912 as defined by 
the Japanese government (Song 2012, 8). There has been more than one dialect for centuries, 
which differentiated the peoples by region and at times by education level. There have been nine 
dialects across Korea including Hamkyong, Pyongan, Hwanghae, and Pyong’yang, Seoul dialect 
or Gyeonggi, Kyonsang, Chungchong, Cholla, Cheju island (Asia Society, n.d.). An image is 
included below of the division of dialects. Some of these dialects have been used to identify 
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people who were then discriminated against throughout history including many that are now 
used in the DPRK.  
Image 3: Map of dialects across the Korean peninsula. “Korean Language Dialects List/Map” 
Importance of Language, Accessed March 24, 2020, 
https://www.importanceoflanguages.com/common-korean-language-dialects/. 
 
External and Internal Constructors of Language 
 Both the DPRK and ROK have had multiple societal and cultural factors that have 
catalyzed the divergence of languages in the respective regions. While the DPRK would 
maintain that they adhere to Juche self-reliance even when it comes to language and linguistic 
evolution, this is not necessarily the case despite the greatest efforts by the government of the 
DPRK. This section will discuss how the language policies and language divergence developed 
and how outside languages shaped the language divergence. This section will begin by talking 
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about the DPRK and then the ROK. While many external actors influenced both regions, the 
response of the DPRK and the ROK have been different.  
DPRK’s Language Development 
At the beginning of the division, Russian loanwords and phrases became highly 
influential within the DPRK because the Soviet Union was its occupier (Hamad 2018, 23; Song 
2005, 172). Despite this influence, the DPRK government maintains that these words and 
phrases are original to the Korean language, which is in line with Juche ideology (Marino, n.d.). 
The DPRK is an interesting case of the divergence of language because of the importance that 
Juche plays in the development of linguistic policies (Song 2005, 169). In the DPRK, there have 
been large sweeps of language reform when they tried to implement Juche policies. Juche policy 
is a policy of linguistic purity and self-reliance as it is with all other policies of the DPRK (Lee 
2018, 23). Kim Il Sung believed that language was the most powerful tool to redeveloping 
people’s thinking and to promote ethnonationalism (Lee 2018, 23 & 26). As mentioned 
previously, the tie between language and nationalism is strongly linked to the Japanese 
colonization as the language was both stripped from Koreans in an attempt to make them more 
placative to Japanese rule and used to identify Koreans when the Japanese military would 
“suppress rebellions” (Song 2005, 165; Lee 2018, 27). As a legacy from the colonial period, the 
DPRK responded by strongly tying the idea of language as a symbol of nationalism in a desire to 
remove outside influences and put in place these purification policies. Purification discussions 
show that language is not just words alone but an expansion of identity and how things are 
interpreted. This is important to the identity discourse of a nation and also in creating 
intersubjectivity among the inhabitants. 
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At the end of the Korean War, the estimated illiteracy rate within the DPRK was 2.3 
million which was one-fourth of the population at the time (Kim 1978, 167). In 1945 in response, 
the DPRK government implemented an anti-illiteracy campaign throughout the region. The 
campaign was launched in 1946 and was all-encompassing including adult learning and youth 
learning in all demographics from rural to urban areas (Song 2005, 169). After the campaign in 
1949, the DPRK touted a 100% literacy rate (Lee 2018, 30-31). While they had naturally 
progressed towards purification, the government implemented a comprehensive and extremist 
plan for purification in 1964 (Kim 1978, 167). According to the policy, all Sino-Korean, Chinese 
Orthography (Hanja), Sino-Japanese, and loanwords were eliminated, and replaced by native 
Korean words, and, if there was no replacement, these words were transformed to follow Joseon-
geul syntax (Hamad 2018, 21; Song 2005, 169). Politics and science were two areas that Sino-
Korean remained due to the lack of replacement words and the complication of changing these 
words (Lee 2018, 38). The importance of this decision is that it displays the level of importance 
put on language in order to maintain national unity. This shows the degree of limitation of 
external influence within the DPRK from outside influences, especially former occupiers such as 
Japan and, to an extent, Russia. During this time, 50,000 words were purified and published in 
the Native Korean Dictionary in 1968 (Song 2005, 169; Lee 2018, 39). Joseon-geul-only policy 
is still carried out until today, the 21st century. Following this policy, the Pyong’yang dialect 
became the official dialect in the DPRK in 1966, replacing the former Seoul or Gyeonggi dialect 
(Song 2005, 164). 
While the policy has continued into the 21st century, it has allowed for certain unrefined 
language to be learned. An example of this break from purification is the inclusion of English as 
a foreign language. It is taught from the fourth grade as a tool for trade and tourism within the 
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DPRK (Paik 2018, 128). Although it is taught, the English language instruction generally focuses 
more on grammatical functions and less on discourse and, after the years that the students spend 
studying it, which they can choose to learn as a foreign language from elementary school till 
high school and in university, there is much loss of language skill due to lack of use and 
confrontation with the language. An exception to this is in the tourism industry, foreign relations, 
and international trade companies (Paik 2018, 129). As time has gone on, the English programs 
in rural areas have reportedly been phased out, leading to a further deficit (Paik 2018, 129). 
While Chinese was not taught for some time in the DPRK, since the ROK still used Hanja, 
Chinese characters that were incorporated into the Korean language, the DPRK decided to 
reinstate Hanja into school learning in hopes to reunify with the south. Much like the ROK, the 
DPRK desires to reunite under their ideology and governmental institutions. They see the 
inclusion of Hanja can make sure that the Korean language used in both countries does not 
diverge too much. While the citizens are taught Hanja, the understanding of the characters is 
lacking since it is not used outside of school in the DPRK (Song 2005, 170). 
In sum, the DPRK remains rather closed off even when it comes to language use. The 
policies in place leave little room for outside languages to be used regularly within the nation 
while continuing to desire as much purism as possible within the Korean language. The national 
dialect is also Pyong’yang dialect (Lee 2018, 47). They have allowed for the people to learn 
languages such as English in hopes of growing on the global scale; however, this policy has had 
little impact as English is only in use in school and students mainly focus on grammar. While 
Hanja is also taught in the DPRK, it is not in use in daily life and has similar problems to those 
of learning English. 
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ROK’s Language Development 
 The ROK had a different experience with their language development than that of the 
DPRK. From the onset of the division, the English language was highly influential in the region. 
During the United States’ occupation of the ROK, English became the official language to 
remove miscommunication and help organization efforts (Lee 2018, 29-30). While English has 
remained influential throughout the history of the ROK, the place of other influential languages 
such as Chinese and Japanese has been a little less stable. There have been several campaigns by 
interest groups to purify the Korean language in the ROK by returning to Han-geul-only policy 
with a similar desire by purists to remove and replace difficult Hanja (Chinese characters), Sino-
Korean, and foreign loanwords (Park 1989, 569-572; 564). The main target for most of these 
interest groups was Japanese by pushing to remove Japanese words from the ROK lexicon due to 
the history of colonization and the shared grievances against Japan among the people of the 
ROK. The initiative to remove and replace as many Japanese words as possible with native 
Korean words was carried out by the US military government in 1948 (Lee 2018, 40). In 1976, 
Park Chung-hee implemented the most drastic language policy that required Korean purification, 
which mainly focused on foreign words to increase nationalism and remove English’s influence 
that had been on the rise in the 1970s. The policy only lasted until 1979 and had very little 
influence on the people in the ROK (Lee 2018, 42-43, 45). 
Despite purification efforts, Chinese and English have played important roles in the ROK 
society. Since 1972, 1,800 Hanja characters, remaining from a time when Chinese was the 
primary written language, have been taught in school to be used in addition to the Han-geul 
(Song 2005, 167). Over half of the ROK’s lexicon is derived from Chinese and not natively 
derived, which was why the purification movements never caught hold (Hamad 2018, 23; 
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McClintock 2012, 21). Between 2008 and 2017, there has been a significant rise in students who 
desire to learn Chinese due to the influential nature of China in the region (Paik 2018, 130). 
Along the same lines, English language learning has been pursued heavily by both the ROK 
government and the people as a form of globalization. Beginning in 1991, the Korean Scholastic 
Ability Test includes an English listening section (Paik 2018, 126). English language courses 
have been compulsory for middle school and high school students since 1998; however, it was 
offered as a foreign language before this (McClintock 2012, 22).  
The implementation of both Hanja and English has gone beyond just the schools. Public 
and road signs throughout the ROK are written in Hanja, Han-geul, and romanization (Song 
2005, 167). English and Han-geul are used in signs and businesses often use English to enhance 
their advertising campaigns (McClintock 2012, 23). Along with multi-language road signs, many 
people in the ROK have adopted English names in addition to their Korean names (Lee 2018, 
44). English is ubiquitous throughout the ROK. The desire to learn English is so strong that there 
are twenty-one English villages where Koreans can practice English in an immersive situation 
with foreigners from various English-speaking countries (Song 2012, 15). 
For people in the ROK, English serves as a sign of globalization, modernization, and 
success in the global market (Paik 2018, 127). There is also great accessibility to outside travel in 
the ROK and students often study for a period outside of their home country (McClintock 2012, 
23). To further the inclusion of English in the ROK, five of their global and most prosperous 
companies, including LG and Samsung, conduct business in English and use English advertising 
(Paik 2018, 127). These different factors have all contributed to the ubiquitous presence of 
English within the ROK and it is no wonder that it has become an integral part of their lexicon. It 
is estimated that up to ninety percent of the new borrowed words in the ROK are derived from 
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English (McClintock 2012, 22). They borrow, compound, and derivate many words from English 
to the extent that English speakers who can read Han-geul can learn some words without any 
difficulty because of their English roots (Paik 2018, 127). This was not something that the 
government passively observed happening. Many initiatives were begun by the government, not 
only in schools but in everyday life, to build up English understanding within the region. One 
such initiative was Lee Myungbook administration’s 2008-2013 push for English emersion 
programs such as villages where individuals can go and have conversations with native English 
speakers for a day (Paik 2018, 124). In recent years, there has also been discussion of making 
English an official language in addition to Han-geul; however, as of 2020, Han-geul is still the 
only official language of the ROK (Song 2012, 16).  
While English is prolific in the ROK, many other languages remain influential within the 
lexicon of the state and English is far from being the primary language spoken within the ROK. 
52.1% of the words in the ROK are Sino-Korean which still shows the influence of the Chinese 
language within the ROK. 45.5% of the words are pure Korean. Finally, only 2.4% of the words 
are loanwords, of which most of those are from English but far from a degrading of Korean 
language by the English language (Song 2012, 9). Unlike the DPRK, the ROK uses the original 
official dialect of Korea from 1912, which is the Seoul dialect (Song 2012, 8). The English 
language remains influential within the ROK; however, Han-geul is still the main form of 
communication within the region. The differences between the ROK and the DPRK are 
undeniable with the ROK having full use of Hanja, English, and Han-geul in not only the 
schools but in daily life. This is in stark contrast to those in the DPRK who only learn it in school 
unless they are in an international affairs position. The purification efforts in the ROK have also 
been limited compared to those in the DPRK leaving many words in the ROK lexicon that are 
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derived from Chinese, English, and Japanese. There is also a difference in the causes of these 
two divergences. For the DPRK, a major cause was Juche ideology and Korea’s history with 
outside forces stripping the identity of the Koreans by imposing language restrictions. In the 
ROK, the evolution of language has primarily been driven by the globalization of the region and 
the historic diversity of the language. These factors have led to gaps between the two languages 
that are evident through a brief examination of the two dialects.  
Linguistic Differences Between the ROK and the DPRK 
 Throughout both languages, many markers remind Korean speakers that they are 
different. While accent is one identifier of people from the two different regions, the most 
obvious and challenging area of differentiation is the words with no equivalents in the other 
region and words that have a different meaning in the respective regions. There are many 
examples of these differences, which will be emphasized in this section. First, this section will 
discuss the difference between the name for written Korean within the DPRK and the ROK. In 
the DPRK, it is called Joseon-geul harkening back to the Joseon era while in the ROK it is called 
the Han-geul (Song 2005, 170). Joseon and Hanguk are how they respectively refer to the 
peninsula of Korea. In the ROK, the word tongmu, which is the word for friend in the DPRK, has 
been replaced by other words for friend such as chingu since the word began to mean comrade in 
the DPRK (Marino, n.d.). Many words also have a different meaning in the DPRK and the ROK. 
Another word is nodong, which means all labor in the DPRK but means exclusively physical 
labor in the ROK (Song 2005, 173). Many words are spelled differently, which can lead to 
confusion between the written language in the two regions (Song 2005, 174). Finally, due to the 
high use of English loanwords within the ROK, words such as those for shopping, which is not 
truly necessary in the DPRK, ice cream, and others have different roots in the DPRK (Hamad 
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2018, 24). 55,000 words used in daily language have been recorded to differ between the DPRK 
and the ROK.  
Significance of the Language Divide 
 It is important to look at the implications that language divergence has on these two 
societies. First, it impacts the way that the two states see each other. The separation of the 
language also shows a divergence in culture and social structures. For one, the DPRK’s policy on 
purism is largely due to Juche ideology, which emphasizes national individualism and self-
reliance. In the ROK, much of the difference in language is due to its desire to enter the global 
market and be competitive economically. However, there are still some in the ROK who see 
purism as a desired goal due to the history of colonialism and stripping of Korean identity. 
Despite the similarities between the two languages, the differences are telling of the trajectories 
of the two countries as can be seen in the example of the word used for friend. The intentional 
switching of official dialect in the DPRK to the Pyong’yang dialect shows how the state is 
separate from the ROK. 
 The impacts on individuals is one of the more important aspects of divergence in 
language. The individuals within the DPRK and the ROK are separated by language which 
causes them to recognize each other as the other. Otherness is interesting in this case as many 
people in the ROK view the Pyong’yang dialect speaker to mean that the speaker is 
impoverished, uneducated, and lacking in social adeptness. This coupled with the emotional toll 
of the political division and the animosity of the history of conflict has a compounding effect on 
the creation of the other. There is also the issue of miscommunication in general that leads to 
greater frustration between the populations of the DPRK and the ROK. A famous example of this 
frustration was the joint hockey team in the 2018 Winter Olympics. While the occasion was 
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important in showing a desire to once again be unified, it played out much differently as many 
miscommunications happened on the team and the members had trouble understanding each 
other’s lives due to the lack of shared experience or the lack of a word for a concept that may 
exist in the respective members’ dialects. There has also been a project within the ROK to 
alleviate some of the difficulties this language barrier causes by an app. Univoca is an app that 
allows people who are originally from the DPRK to translate commonly used ROK words into a 
DPRK word that is synonymous or as close to the original as possible. This was developed due 
to the approximately 3,600 words that are used daily in the ROK that are different from those 
used in the DPRK and linguists have recorded approximately 55,000 words that are different 
(Lee 2018, 52; Hamad 2018, 24). 
 The problem caused by language divergence is most visible in the experiences of 
defectors from the DPRK who must adjust to not only life in the ROK but also the language. 
Upon entry into the ROK, they are required to participate in language classes for 12 weeks 
during integration training (Ministry of Unification 2019). This is done to assist them in getting 
jobs, finding their way around the new environment, and getting used to new discourse. While 
this program does help with the transition, most defectors say that it takes around one to three 
years for them to adjust to the significant inconvenience in conversation and 21% were very 
inconvenienced by the linguistic differences (Lee 2018, 52). Another issue outside the simple 
divergence in the Korean language is the issue that many people in the ROK are well-versed in 
English and many high-level jobs require at least intermediate English knowledge. This puts the 
defectors at a great disadvantage as many of them do not possess the same level of knowledge as 
most Koreans from the ROK. Many defectors are limited to low-level jobs with little upward 
mobility. Defectors also have increasingly struggled with discrimination because they are easily 
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marked by their accents. As mentioned previously, the accent is equated with being uneducated, 
socially inept, poor, and as the other (Hamad 2018, 25). This causes complications for defectors 
in work, school, and daily life. Focusing on defectors as a case study, the divergence in language 
reveals itself as having a significant impact on the discussion of reunification, which includes 
economic and social difficulties; however, this discussion should be saved for later research. 
Language is considered the greatest social barrier to reunification (Hamad 2018, 24).  
Conclusion 
 Due to policy, social, and cultural differences, there has been a divergence between the 
DPRK and the ROK. In the DPRK, they have largely adopted a Korean purism movement within 
the nation based on Juche ideology while the ROK has adopted a policy that has allowed them to 
open to globalism and lack the desire to implement extreme policy to eliminate non-pure Korean. 
The two countries also have different dialects, thus separating them further. This has delineated 
the two areas as separate since their language use shows them that they are different not only in 
place of origin but in ideology, social background, and culture. It has also led to 
miscommunications between individuals of these separate countries because of the high volume 
of words that are different in the DPRK and the ROK. This is extremely important in the division 
between the DPRK and the ROK because it allows for identifying the other. This can lead to 
discrimination as there is animosity between the people of both regions. It leads to an inability to 
communicate properly which does not allow the individuals to get jobs that are more 
economically and socially advantageous as they cannot communicate properly. It also causes a 
lack of cultural and social unity. 
The defectors from the DPRK feel the effects of this difference the most as they are 
attempting to transition to life in the ROK. They are often at a disadvantage in the job market 
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because of their lack of language skills in both ROK Korean and English. This creates a 
dangerous cycle for them as they can experience more poverty and lack of connections. The 
defectors can also experience discrimination as many have a different accent that is considered to 
mark less-educated individuals and lack of language expertise. Given the long history of conflict 
many in the ROK have negative feelings towards these groups. This shows some of the 
difficulties that language differences also cause complications for reunification policy as the 
reunified nation would have to train the integrating society in the language that they speak in 
order to even begin reunification. Language has major implications in the livelihoods of 
defectors, leads to miscommunication, solidifies division, and has major implications on 
reunification. Reunification is made more politically difficult by language because there can be 
miscommunications between the leaders engaged in a discussion. Political reunification is more 
difficult because there needs to be a proper way to integrate when considering language 
differences between the two regions which go beyond simple words to social constructions and 
identities. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Through this research, it is clear that division is not a simple issue of state policy, state 
action, regime type, or economic system, but an issue of the social construction of identity such 
as the divergent identities of the ROK and the DPRK. This is particularly salient in the case of 
the ROK and the DPRK as both seemingly want to reunify but cannot come to a workable plan 
as their societies have diverged. This is due to the fact that these intersubjective points such as 
language and ideas such as Juche have been developing and diverging through policy, different 
views of history, and different discourses within the DPRK and the ROK. This has been seen 
through Juche ideology in how it has been developed in the DPRK through historical 
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experiences such as Confucian ideals, old isolationist policies, and the view on imperialism and 
outside forces on the Korean peninsula. In addition, there have been public displays, etiquette, 
and monuments to reinforce Juche discourse within the DPRK society. This allowed the Juche 
ideology to become an intersubjective view within the DPRK society giving it an important role 
in the division.  
Language, too, has shown the importance of social construction a divided Korean 
peninsula. One important aspect of this division is how the DPRK seeks to keep linguistic purity 
in order to strengthen the discursive nature of nationalism and reinforce self-sufficiency. While it 
does not work consistently within the DPRK’s Korean language, it shows that language is not 
simply words but ideas. This outcome is also seen in the ROK as they did not follow the 
extremes of linguistic purism because of the desire to be more open to outside markets. The 
ROK also began to adopt outside language as they began to emphasize globalism in public 
discourse. English as the primary language of globalization became more intersubjectively 
important in the ROK and then began to be integrated into their lexicon. This again shows that 
the linguistics show more than just words but what has been socially constructed within the 
region as words are themselves social constructs. 
Due to their importance, it would be irresponsible of people to ignore the social factors 
that influence the continued division of the ROK and the DPRK. Moving forward scholars 
looking at the division between the DPRK and the ROK need to pay attention to these details, 
which are not limited just to Juche and linguistics, as they are important in understanding how 
the two regions interact, how to help defectors integrate into a different society, and how to begin 
thinking about reunification talks. These cases show that there will be difficulty in reunifying as 
these divisionary social constructions have been developed over time and become intersubjective 
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within society. The incongruence of Juche found in the DPRK and a globalized, democratic 
society that is found in the ROK have contributed to the persistence of the divided peninsula. For 
defectors to the ROK, it is a challenging transition going from a mindset that is closed off to the 
outside world to one that will allow others in and lives in coexistence with many other nations. In 
reunification policy, the incongruence will make finding a middle ground in policy as well as 
finding intersubjectivity of the nation thereafter difficult. A lack of intersubjectivity still allows 
for the divide to persist and factions to break off.  
Linguistic differences not only make it difficult for defectors to integrate into the ROK or 
DPRK because of communication but because, as discussed earlier language gains meaning from 
social construction that has developed through years of use. Without the years of practical use, 
defectors find it difficult to truly connect with the meaning of a word similar to how it is when 
learning a new language. This challenge causes there to be increased social division along with 
the differences in dialects, which also carry social meaning such as education levels and social 
status. This will have significant implications for reunification as there will have to be a 
rethinking of how the government confronts languages as this may be used to disadvantage some 
individuals through biases or hate.  
Social construction and division are not limited to this case only but have large scale 
implications for other areas of the world that have divisions. This research shows that there is 
more to be observed in these areas such as ideology and how it came to be. This will assist in a 
better understanding of the full problem and may present better tactics to be used in these 
situations in order to minimize divisions and their impacts. Scholars researching division must 
increase attention to social factors similar to Juche that contribute to the divisions of other 
groups. The discourse around Juche shows that social constructions can reinforce nationalism, 
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division, disconnection, and otherness. This is important to observe as this can help inform other 
research by illuminating the importance of social constructions. Language is also an important 
factor for scholars researching division to consider as it is a social construction that reinforces 
ideas within the population such as globalism or isolationism of a society. It also shows how 
social constructs influence how different groups perceive each other such as intelligence level or 
otherness. Social constructions are important factors to consider in the division in any case. 
These social constructions present many interesting questions that need to be examined 
further. One such question is what other influential social constructs exist within the DPRK and 
the ROK that reinforce their division? This study has only presented two cases here, but others 
exist, such as religion. An important question for political advisors to the ROK and the DPRK to 
answer is in light of the social constructions presented here, how do the people in power 
proceed? What policies help defectors integrate more easily into society in light of these 
findings? Does this change the way that the governments confront reunification talks? Outside of 
the case of Korea, scholars could research whether the public discourse is influential in the 
division in other areas that are divided. 
The social constructions that influence division in the DPRK and the ROK are important 
to take into account moving forward. Differences between the DPRK and the ROK are not going 
to be easy to reconcile; however, that does not mean that efforts should not be taken to 
understand how to confront it. If these issues are taken to account more viable solutions may 
present themselves, and social and cultural understanding may ensue thereafter. Proper 
knowledge of how these differences came to be may allow for there to be more mutual 
understanding across the board and may provide unique, innovative solutions.  
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